Wed 30 Nov 2005
A Verbal Shell Game in Action
Posted by Tim Lee under Uncategorized
[2] Comments
I think the legal analysis in this article really illustrates the muddled state of post-Casey abortion law. If the Supreme Court in Casey had fully upheld Roe and said that abortion was a right akin to free speech or freedom of religion, that would, at least, have been a clear legal position. Alternatively, if the court had overturned Roe and ruled that states have the right to restrict abortion rights as they please, that would have given lower courts clear guidance on how to deal with these issues.
But it seems to me that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey has been bourne out by subsequent controversies:
The shortcomings of Roe did not include lack of clarity: Virtually all regulation of abortion before the third trimester was invalid. But to come across this phrase in the joint opinion–which calls upon federal district judges to apply an “undue burden” standard as doubtful in application as it is unprincipled in origin–is really more than one should have to bear.
The joint opinion frankly concedes that the amorphous concept of “undue burden” has been inconsistently applied by the Members of this Court in the few brief years since that “test” was first explicitly propounded by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Akron I, supra. Because the three Justices now wish to “set forth astandard of general application,” the joint opinion announces that “it is important to clarify what is meant by an undue burden,” I certainly agree with that, but I do not agree that the joint opinion succeeds in the announced endeavor. To the contrary, its efforts at clarification make clear only that the standard is inherently manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable in practice.
The joint opinion explains that a state regulation imposes an “undue burden” if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” An obstacle is “substantial,” we are told, if it is “calculated[,] [not] to inform the woman’s free choice, [but to] hinder it.” This latter statement cannot possibly mean what it says. Any regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what the joint opinion concedes is the State’s “substantial” interest in protecting unborn life will be “calculated [to] hinder” a decision to have an abortion. It thus seems more accurate to say that the joint opinion would uphold abortion regulations only if they do not unduly hinder the woman’s decision. That, of course, brings us right back to square one: Defining an “undue burden” as an “undue hindrance” (or a “substantial obstacle”) hardly “clarifies” the test. Consciously or not, the joint opinion’s verbal shell game will conceal raw judicial policy choices concerning what is “appropriate” abortion legislation.
In practice, it seems, the “undue burden” standard is leading to a slow unraveling of abortion rights, as legislatures slowly make getting an abortion more and more burdensome. Precisely because the standard is so amorphous, it’s very difficult for the courts do draw a line in the sand and strike down any laws that cross it, as long as any given law isn’t too big a leap from the one that came before. I don’t think pro-choice activists have any reason to be happy or optimistic about the jurisprudential status quo.
